


# Gödel's Incompleteness Theorems

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# Outline

- I History
- II Background and Definitions
- III The 1<sup>st</sup> Incompleteness Theorem
- IV The 2<sup>nd</sup> Incompleteness Theorem
- V Implications and Related Results

# Part I

## History

# Foundational Crisis of Mathematics

- Establishing the Foundations of Math
  - 300 BC: Euclid's *Elements*
  - 1874: Cantor's set theory
  - 1879: Frege's *Begriffsschrift*
- Russell's Paradox: A Contradiction
  - $S = \{x \mid x \notin x\}$  ("The set of all sets that don't contain themselves")
  - Is  $S \in S$ ?
  - Contradiction both ways!
- New Field: Formal Logic
  - 1910, 1912, 1914: Russell and Whitehead's *Principia Mathematica*

# Hilbert's Program

- 1 Completeness
- 2 Consistency
- 3 Decidability

# Hilbert's Program

- ① Completeness
- ② Consistency
- ③ Decidability
  - Turing's Halting Problem

# Hilbert's Program

- ① Completeness
  - Gödel's First Incompleteness Theorem
- ② Consistency?
  - Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem
- ③ Decidability

## Part II

# Background and Definitions



# Formal Systems

## Definition (Formal System)

A *formal system* is a system of axioms equipped with rules of inference, which allow one to generate new theorems (e.g. ZFC).

# Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic

Theorem (Fundamental Theorem of Arithmetic)

*Every natural number has a unique prime factorization.*

# Gödel Numberings

A **Gödel numbering** associates logical statements to unique natural numbers.

To define this, first we map each mathematical symbol in our formal system to a number.

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$x$	$N(x)$
$0$	1
$=$	2
$\neg$	3
$($	4
$)$	5
$\vdots$	$\vdots$

# Gödel Numberings

Definition (Gödel Numbering  $\Gamma$  of a statement  $f = f_1 f_2 \dots f_n$ )

$$\Gamma(f) = \prod_{i=1}^n p_i^{N(f_i)},$$

where  $p_i$  is the  $i^{th}$  prime and  $N(f_i)$  is the number associated to symbol  $f_i$  by the chosen mapping.

## Example

Consider the statement  $f = "0 = 0"$ .

We first map each symbol to a number to get  $\langle 1, 2, 1 \rangle$ .

From here, we calculate the Gödel number as  $\Gamma(f) = 2^1 3^2 5^1 = 90$ .

# Gödel Numberings

Why convert statements to numbers?

- To prove properties of formal systems via the known properties of number theory
- Associate each logical operation on statements  $f_1$  and  $f_2$  with an arithmetic operation on  $\Gamma(f_1)$  and  $\Gamma(f_2)$ 
  - Gödel proved the correctness of 46 of these numerical operations
  - Essentially created a computer to do math using number theory
- For example, **Sub** corresponds to dividing out and multiplying in the appropriate prime powers

# Common Notation

- $x$  **Sub**  $(u, y)$ : within the statement associated with a number  $x$ , whenever you see a  $u$  substitute a  $y$
- $p \vdash A$ :  $p$  proves some statement  $A$  in the language of  $p$

## Part III

# The 1<sup>st</sup> Incompleteness Theorem

1 The Statement

2 The Proof

## The 1<sup>st</sup> Incompleteness Theorem

1 The Statement

2 The Proof



# The Statement

## Theorem

*There cannot exist a formal system capable of sufficient arithmetic (i.e. not trivial) that is both consistent and complete.*

## The 1<sup>st</sup> Incompleteness Theorem

1 The Statement

2 The Proof

# Proof Idea

- Contradictions seem to arise from self-referential statements
  - E.g. “This statement is false”, set of all sets that don’t contain themselves, etc.
- Encode mathematical statements, then use the encoding recursively to produce a self-referential statement
- Can we produce a statement talking about its own provability?

# The Proof

- Consider the formula  $f(x) = \neg \exists p [ p \vdash (x \text{ **Sub** } (0, x)) ]$ 
  - Here,  $f$  takes as input a Gödel number  $x$  of a statement.
  - "There does not exist a proof  $p$  such that  $p$  proves  $x$  substituted for each instance of 0 with  $x$ ."
- This formula has Gödel number  $\Gamma(f)$ .
- Pass  $\Gamma(f)$  in as input to  $f$ :

$$f(\Gamma(f)) = \neg \exists p [ p \vdash (\Gamma(f) \text{ **Sub** } (0, \Gamma(f))) ]$$

- Simplify the inside  $\Gamma(f) \text{ **Sub** } (0, \Gamma(f))$ :
  - $\Gamma(f) \text{ **Sub** } (0, \Gamma(f))$
  - $= \neg \exists p [ p \vdash (\Gamma(f) \text{ **Sub** } (0, \Gamma(f))) ]$
  - $= f(\Gamma(f))$
- Hence,  $f(\Gamma(f)) = \neg \exists p [ p \vdash f(\Gamma(f)) ]$ .

# The Proof

- If we name the statement  $g = f(\Gamma(f))$  for ease, we have  $g = \neg \exists p [ p \vdash g ]$ .
  - $g$  says “There does not exist a proof  $p$  of  $g$ ”  $\iff$  “This statement is unprovable”
- If  $g$  is false, then there exists a proof of it, but that would make it true, a contradiction.
- $g$  must be true and unprovable.



# Notes on the Proof

- Generally interpret this theorem to mean “Every consistent system has unprovable true statements.”
- Can't just add unprovable statements as axioms

## Part IV

# The 2<sup>nd</sup> Incompleteness Theorem

3 The Statement

4 The Proof

## The 2<sup>nd</sup> Incompleteness Theorem

3 The Statement

4 The Proof



# The Statement

## Theorem

*Any formal system capable of sufficient arithmetic cannot prove its own consistency.*

## The 2<sup>nd</sup> Incompleteness Theorem

3 The Statement

4 The Proof

# The Proof

- Assume (for contradiction) that there exists inside formal system  $F$  a proof  $C$  of  $F$ 's own consistency.
- Recall our Gödel sentence  $g$  ("This statement is unprovable") from the proof of the first theorem.
- The first theorem showed that if a system is consistent, then  $g$  is unprovable within it.
- By definition,  $C \implies [F \text{ is consistent}]$ .
- But, by the first incompleteness theorem,  $[F \text{ is consistent}] \implies g$ .
- This is a proof of  $g$ , but  $g$  was already shown to be unprovable.
- Hence, the mere existence of  $C$ , a proof of  $F$ 's own consistency, leads to a contradiction, so such a proof cannot exist.





# Notes on the Proof

Why is  $g$  being true an issue/contradiction here, but not in the first theorem?

- A contradiction arises when  $g$  is *proven*.
- The first theorem said “if  $F$  is consistent, then  $g$  is true.”
- It doesn’t become a proof of  $g$  until you prove that  $F$  is consistent.

## Part V

# Implications and Related Results

# Implications

- Cannot create a system containing all truths and their proofs
- No system can verify its own reliability

# Related Results in Consistency

- Gentzen's Consistency Proof
  - Proved the Peano Axioms are consistent
  - Proof relies on another system being consistent
- Why can't we prove ZFC's consistency?
  - Almost all math expressible in ZFC
  - Need to step out of ZFC to prove something about it
  - Not enough math in systems stronger than ZFC

# Related Results in Unprovability

- Statements can be true, false, or unprovable
- Examples of proven unprovable claims
  - Paris-Harrington Theorem (first)
  - Kruskal's Theorem
  - Goodstein's Theorem
- Continuum Hypothesis
  - We know  $|\mathbb{N}| < |\mathbb{R}|$
  - Is there a set  $\mathcal{S}$  such that  $|\mathbb{N}| < |\mathcal{S}| < |\mathbb{R}|$ ?
  - Unprovable within ZFC and truth value still unknown



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